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Abstract 
The main question addressed is how transstate groups and associations interact with states 
and markets in migrant-induced flows of financial remittances, knowledge, political ideas and 
interests across state borders. First, how has academic and policy thinking on development cast 
the role of transstate social groups and non-state organizations? Second, in what ways are the 
activities of transstate cliques, groups and organizations, which embody some of the community 
principles, complementary or incompatible with those of other institutions functioning according 
to the logics of states and markets? The questions raised relate to the more general question of 
the shifting balance of community, state and market under conditions commonly called 
globalization. The argument put forward in this analysis is that the new enthusiasm towards the 
crucial role of transstate communities and migrant organizations is an effort to fuse principles of 
“community” with those of the global “market”. Yet there are both compatibilities and 
incompatibilities of the community and the market principles. Moreover, the principles of 
transstate “community” and the national “state” may clash in the case of those who have chosen 
the exit option and also exert voice in the countries and localities of origin, because they partake 
in decision-making but are not affected by the consequences of these decisions. The first part of 
the analysis outlines the ideational shift to “community” as reference category for development 
thinking on the part of international organizations over the past decades. The second part 
discusses if and how migrant organizations and groups have been complementary or 
incompatible with state and market principles, using the examples of small kinship groups, 
village associations, networks of businesspersons, epistemic communities, and diasporas. The 
third part touches on the implications for further research and argues that the concept of 
transstate social spaces, that is, spaces “in between” the local and the global, but also between 
states, can be used as an instrument to shed light on the dilemmas of border-crossing democracy 
and citizenship.  
 
Key words: Transstate Social Spaces, Development, Migrant Associations, Community, 
Market, State. 
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Transstate1 communities and organizations have been at the center of the optimistic visions 
of national and international economic development policy establishments. There are three 
elements of this new enthusiasm. First, the surge in remittances over the past three decades 
transferred by transstate migrants has given rise to a kind of euphoria. Migrant2 remittances 
constitute the newest “development mantra” among institutions like the World Bank, the French 
and the British government, and development NGOs (Kapur 2004). Remittances are perceived to 
be a nearly ideal form of “bottom up” development finance. Indeed, looking at overall numbers, 
annual remittances to developing countries more than doubled during the 1990s and have been 
approximately 20 percent higher than official development assistance (ODA) to these countries. 
And certainly migrant remittances have been on par with foreign direct investment in many parts 
of the developing world. Remittances have increased with the upward trend in the rate of 
transstate migration (United Nations 2004). Second, knowledge transferred through networks of 
scientists and experts from North to South are increasingly seen as “brain circulation” beneficial 
to all parties involved (cf. Findlay 2003). The transfer of ideas is seen as helping developing and 
transformation countries to participate in knowledge societies, which are the basis for 
innovation, productivity, and development. Third, even the transfer of political remittances, 
namely ideas regarding the rule of law, good governance, democracy, and human rights, has 
achieved a growing prominence in the aftermath of interventions into armed conflicts and efforts 
at reconstructing countries ravaged by civil war – evidenced lately in Somalia, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. Occasionally diasporas made up of exiles, refugees, and labor migrants are hailed as 
mediators in conflict resolution, for example in the cases of South Africa or Nigeria (cf. Shain 
and Barth 2003).  
The positive role attributed to transstate migration and mobility may come as a surprise. 
After all, transstate migration has long been considered to be a development failure. It can be 
conceptualized as territorial or geographical exit upon failure of state and other institutions to 
deliver well-being and human security (cf. Hirschman 1970). Nowadays, however, international 
organizations led by the World Bank, NGOs, and nation-state governments increasingly tout 
remittances – financial capital, knowledge, and political ideas – as a solution to development. We 
have witnessed in the past decades a slow but steady increase in the proportion of transstate 
migrants as a percentage of the world population from one to two per cent in the 1960s to about 
three per cent in the current period. One of the expected consequences of this increase is that 
there should be a greater potential for transstate flows such as remittances. While the 
assumptions underlying the developmental effects are problematic, the focus here is different: 
not the impact on development as such but the role of migrants and mobile persons as transstate 
subjects.  In an academic framework, certain categories of migrants have been re-conceptualized 
as transstate actors (cf. Faist 2004). Now international organizations and NGOs have followed 
suit. 
The argument put forward in this analysis is that the new enthusiasm over the crucial role of 
transstate communities and migrant organizations constitutes an effort to fuse principles of 
“community” with those of the global “market.” Yet there are both compatibilities and 
                                                                  
1 Here, I use the term transstate instead of transnational. This usage indicates that the point of departure are not 
relations in between nations but in between states and across states. 
2 The focus here is on transnational ties arising out of South-North migration and not South-South migration. But note 
that fully 40 per cent of transnational migrants move between so-called developing countries. Also, this paper deals 
with transnational and not with domestic migrants within states, although the latter may be much more numerous. To 
compare: there were about 175 million transnational migrants in the early twenty-first century. By contrast, India 
alone has 200 million internal migrants, and China has 120 million. In Vietnam, there were about 4.5 million internal 
migrants from 1994-99 in contrast to 300,000 who went abroad during the same period. Among the poorest persons, 
migration takes place primarily within and between developing countries. For example, many countries in south-east 
Asia heavily rely on cheap migrant labor from neighboring countries, e.g. Indonesian workers in Malaysia. As to 
refugees, two-thirds live in developing countries and more than a third dwell in the least-developed countries. 
Nonetheless, over the past decades, the proportion of transnational migrants vis-à-vis domestic migrants has increased 
(United Nations 2004). 
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incompatibilities between community and market principles. Moreover, the principles of 
transstate “community” and the national “state” may clash -- those who have chosen the exit 
option also exert voice because they partake in decision-making but are not affected by the 
consequences of these decisions. 
How, in fact, do transstate communities interact with the principles of states and markets in 
flows across borders and boundaries? First, how has academic and policy thinking on 
“development” cast the role of communities and non-state organizations? Second, in what ways 
are the activities of transstate cliques, groups, and organizations which embody some of the 
community principles complementary to or incompatible with those of other institutions 
functioning according to the logics of states and markets? Indeed, little is actually understood 
about what  role transstate groups and organizations play vis-à-vis states and markets when it 
comes to the transfer of financial capital such as remittances and investments, knowledge, and 
political ideas. The perspective taken here is not one of global governance but of transstate 
subjects, starting with migrants and their communities.  What is needed is an examination of the 
role of communities for development and the role communities actually play vis-à-vis other 
principles of social order such as the market and the state. The booming interest in the role of 
diasporas and transstate migrant organizations reflects changes in the concepts of development 
that guide the public policies of international and national institutions and NGOs. And the shift 
in attention may signal more fundamentally the changing balance of communities, states, and 
markets. Therefore, the problematique raised relates to the more general question of the shifting 
balance of community, state, and market under conditions commonly called globalization.  
Heuristically, one may distinguish three principles of social order in an ideal typical way – 
community, state, and market. Here, the community principle refers to the notion that social 
order presupposes, or at least benefits from, the rights and duties that are attached to members of 
concrete communities of persons. Communities constitute the cement that integrates the 
members of concrete communities into values of trust, reciprocity, loyalty, and solidarity, 
bounded by rights and obligations of members toward each other. Rights and duties delimit the 
boundaries of communities, which may rest on diverse mechanisms such as kinship lineage, 
shared knowledge and values, belief in common institutions, or religious beliefs. The boundaries 
of the market are quite different in that dispersed competition is ideally driven by the interest of 
human agents in the purposive acquisition of individual goods without much or indeed any 
consideration of, or control over, what impact the pursuit of acquisitive purposes may have on 
others or on other persons’ future selves. The principle of state consists of hierarchical control, 
carrying out binding decisions in political communities. State authority is meant to serve the 
common good, in the case under consideration here culminating in the notion of development. 
Whereas communities are characterized by various notions of boundaries of “us” distinct from 
“others” and markets exist without geographical borders, states – at any rate in their modern 
incarnations since the Westphalian Peace – are defined both by clear territorial borders and 
boundaries set by their function to implement authoritatively binding decisions by the force of 
power and legitimacy. In short, community, market, and state are master mechanisms of social 
order characterized by incompatibilities yet also requiring one another for their function 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1985; cf. Offe 2001). Empirically, the community principle is studied 
through categories such as cliques, groups, and organizations of mobile people; the state 
principle by looking at government and publicly authorized actors; and the market principle by 
looking at firms. 
This analysis focuses on various transstate subjects, i.e., groups and organizations of mobile 
persons, including families, village groups, epistemic communities, and diasporas. Such 
transstate social formations mobilize very diverse forms of capital: financial capital such as 
money in the form of remittances and/or investments; knowledge and professional experience; 
and political ideas, such as ideas on forms of government, rights and responsibilities, and 
democracy. Financial capital, knowledge, and political ideas can be mobilized within the bounds 
of social capital, namely through various forms of reciprocity and solidarity (cf. Portes 1995 and 
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Portes et al. 2002), sometimes called “social remittances” (Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen 2004).  
Analyzing the role of transstate subjects requires a transstate approach to mobility which 
goes beyond the traditional binary concept. The conventional binary concept emphasizes 
emigration from and immigration to particular countries – with possible re-migration to the 
countries of origin. By contrast, transstate migration and mobility should be understood as 
manifold processes linking together countries of origin, destination, and onward migration. The 
focus should be not only on migrants who settle for a meaningful period of time abroad but also 
on those persons who engage in short-term mobility. Such social spaces are characterized by 
dense and continuous transactions across borders (Portes et al. 1999; cf. Basch et al. 1994) 
because, irrespective of where they settle, persons may entertain transstate ties that have impacts 
for the respective countries. Examples of social spaces formed by migrants and mobile people 
are transstate families, hometown associations, epistemic communities of experts and scientists, 
global religious congregations, as well as ethnic and even national communities.3 This goes well 
beyond simply considering the category of former transstate migrants who eventually settle in 
the North, return to the original country, or engage in onward migration.  
Accordingly, the notion of development is understood here in the way that it is used by 
different kinds of transstate communities: in the case of transstate families as an informal 
insurance against economic risks and as an investment in their children’s future; in the case of 
village communities as the improvement of the infrastructure and the provision of local 
collective goods such as education and health; in the case of networks of businesspersons as 
opportunities for investment and optimal interest; in the case of epistemic communities the 
unhindered flow of knowledge; and in the case of national communities a high degree of 
political autonomy, sometimes even involving the formation of an independent nation-state. All 
of these notions resemble the overall lowest common denominator which the term development 
has carried since the late 1940s, namely the vague hope of progression and betterment for those 
parts of the world deemed “underdeveloped” (for a trenchant critique, see Escobar 1995). A 
transstate approach means looking not only at developing countries and countries in 
transformation but also at highly industrialized countries. In the latter case, there is value added 
in, for example, the contributions of migrants to social insurance and welfare state provisions, 
the closing of labor market gaps in the informal service economy, and the values of democracy 
and human rights transported by the highly skilled. 
The first part of this analysis outlines the ideational shift to “community” as a reference 
category for development thinking on the part of international organizations and OECD country 
governments over the past three to four decades. The second part discusses the role of the three 
principles of social order, in particular community vis-à-vis state and market in development 
processes, and looks at how migrant organizations and groups have been complementary or 
incompatible with state and market principles. Transstate analysis involves studying the ties that 
cross emigration and immigration states, sending and receiving regions, and must transcend the 
interdependence between closed units in opening up transstate social spaces. The third section of 
this analysis touches on the implications for further research and argues that the concept of 
transstate social spaces, that is, spaces “in between” the local and the global, but also between 
states, can be used as an instrument to shed light on the dilemmas of border-crossing democracy 
                                                                  
3 Of course not all transnational migrants or mobile persons develop dense and continuous transnational ties. Some of 
them really cut their roots; such as most ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who migrated in the late twentieth 
century. Another problem of transnational research has been over-aggregation. Migrants as actors across borders are 
mainly conceptualized in research and public discourse as “diasporas.” This term tends to treat migrants from a given 
emigration state as a whole, e.g., the Indian diaspora or the Chinese diaspora. This is problematic in three ways. First, 
it implies a one-sided relationship in focusing only on the country of origin. This dovetails with the traditional 
definitions of diaspora which implies forced dispersal, and does not open our eyes to two-way relationships. Second, a 
religious or national diaspora group may not capture self-understanding. For example, not all migrants from Turkey 
consider themselves Turks; some would self-identity as Kurds. Third, there are different levels of aggregation: 
families, villages, regions, nations, and cross-cutting allegiances, such as religions. One needs to unpack the notion of 
diaspora and make room for different types of transnational communities of practice. Here, the term is reserved for 
self-ascribed large national political communities. 
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and citizenship without relying simply on state-centered notions. Of course it goes without 
saying that states themselves – in contrast to more recent ideas on the balance between state, 
market, and community in development – have to be brought back in to the analysis to unearth 
opportunity structures for the emergence of transstate social spaces and thus the role of transstate 
groups and associations in development policy. 
The conceptual evolution of the role of community in 
development 
The importance of community as a pillar of development has increased over the past three 
decades. The more recent focus of development policy on transstate subjects in the context of 
increasing remittances of migrants fits with a context in which the role of the state and the 
market have been fundamentally reevaluated by international development organizations. There 
has been an obvious shift of thinking in the international development policy establishment, 
which has rediscovered transstate migration as a set of processes involving the transfer of 
resources from developed to developing countries. For example, international institutions such as 
the World Bank, but also national organizations and governments, have attributed an increased 
role of communities and transstate communities in particular in development processes (cf. Biao 
2005). Long ago, John Kenneth Galbraith described migration as “the oldest action against 
poverty” (Galbraith 1962; cit. in House of Commons 2004).4 This hunch seems to rest on solid 
foundations in economic theory. If one were to liberalize transstate migration, large gains, 
perhaps equivalent to those envisaged in the WTO’s current “Development Round,” could 
accrue. Ideally, migration will decrease under a global system of free trade for all factors of 
production, including labor, because of factor price equalization, that is, the tendency of wages 
to equalize as workers move from poorer to richer regions of the world. According to neo-
classical theory, this would mean that trade and migration are substitutes: countries that have 
relatively cheaper labor export labor-intensive goods or workers. Over time, differences in the 
prices of goods and the wages of workers should be reduced with freer trade (see, e.g. Fischer, 
Martin and Straubhaar 1997). One of the by-products would be a significant drop in the wage 
level and probably welfare state provisions in highly industrialized immigration countries 
(cf. Hamilton and Whaley 1984). This is also one of the reasons we do not see unfettered 
movement, that is, migration without borders, but instead rather strict boundaries of welfare 
states as to the inclusion of newcomers. 
As expected, there have been critical voices calling into question overly simplistic 
expectations and spurious causalities. Certainly, remittance flows through migrants and transstate 
communities are not a panacea for development problems. After all, the onset and success of 
development processes depend, among other things, on macro-structural conditions, such as land 
reform, a favorable investment climate, an efficient, transparent, and non-corrupt bureaucracy 
and system of governance – to mention only a few of the most obvious candidates. Overall, the 
evidence for development effects is contradictory and fragmentary. Much of the analysis that 
support beliefs about the overall costs and benefits of migration is based on “micro”-level 
research and cannot conclusively demonstrate the validity of “macro”-level conclusions. It is 
deeply problematic to extrapolate from micro-level evidence to macro-level outcomes without 
specifying the mechanisms of the aggregation processes. With respect to knowledge transfer, it 
may be of little practical value for emigration countries, immigration countries, and mobile 
person simply to rename what used to be called “brain drain” as “brain gain.” Such a facile 
                                                                  
4 The regional distribution pattern looks as follows: Latin America and the Caribbean receive the most remittances 
($ 30 bio), followed by South Asia ($18 bio), East Asia and the Pacific ($18 bio), the Middle East and North Africa 
($13 bio), and Europe and Central Asia ($10 bio). Sub-Saharan Africa, including the poorest countries in the world, 
receives the smallest amount of remittances ($4 bio). In Latin America, remittances amount to 2 per cent of the GDP. 
Yet in smaller economies the proportion is much higher: 29 per cent of GNP in Haiti, in El Salvador, Honduras, and 
the Dominican Republic about 15 per cent of GDP (cf. Orozco 2002). 
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renaming overlooks the fact that there are indeed deleterious effects resulting from the 
emigration of so-called highly skilled professionals, such as the care drain in the health sector in 
Southern Africa, or the exit of natural scientists and engineers in the least developed countries, 
where there is little potential for replacing those who have left. Lastly, the involvement of exiles, 
migrants, and refugees in political development as carriers of ideas of human rights and 
democratization ignores the role that some of these groups may have played at the very core of 
perpetuating violent conflicts instead of resolving them; for example, the Tamil Tigers’ long-
distance nationalism. It is noteworthy that the documents presenting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) declared by the United Nations (UN) make no mention of any links 
between transstate migration or diasporas and development. Only a few of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) acknowledge migration or refugee flows and their connection 
to development. Yet all these caveats have not seriously challenged the emphasis on transstate 
subjects as carriers of development. Still, the role of transstate communities is mainly an 
emerging issue, discussed in more specialized forums such as the Global Commission on 
International Migration set up by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan.  
Bringing “community” back into thinking on development policy can be seen as an 
incremental process which has occurred over roughly four successive stages. The first refers to 
the long period after World War Two in which development such as import substitution 
industrialization occurred under mainly state-led industrialization. Corresponding academic 
theories, such as modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s, did not attribute a crucial active 
role to (small) groups and organizations – other than as recipients of massive cultural, political, 
and economic change (see, e.g. Huntington 1966). This state of affairs began to change, making 
a second stage, launched by the World Bank’s 1973 call for targeting development efforts to the 
“poorest of the poor.” This proclamation catalyzed a shift in focus away from growth and toward 
issues of redistribution and equity. Understandably, this ideational move involved an increasing 
emphasis on community participation in development. Whether labeled “farmer-first,” “bottom-
up,” or “grassroots” development strategies, the focus was on decentralization, localization, and 
the satisfaction of basic human needs for food, shelter, health, and what we nowadays call 
human security. 
The foregrounding of community coincided with increasing criticism of the 
“developmental” state and, above all, an attendant greater role of market principles. 
Organizations like the World Bank called for greater participation in the world market 
(McMichael 1996: 111), in marked contrast to policies inspired by dependency theory which 
advocated a partial dissociation from world market participation (e.g. Senghaas 1974). 
Influenced by events of the 1970s and 1980s such as the debt crisis in Latin America and the 
implosion of postcolonial states in parts of Africa and elsewhere, academic studies also 
emphasized the economic distortions effected by rent-seeking elites in command of predatory 
states (e.g. Bates 1988). International development institutions began to place more faith in the 
operation of more-or-less unfettered markets, and in the benefits of market-driven growth as 
promising for societies whose potential for economic growth had been stymied by what were 
considered inefficient state institutions. A shorthand description of this trend was the 
“Washington Consensus.” Indeed, international organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) pressured recipient governments to rely on price signals and little else for social 
coordination, thus advocating privatization, deregulation, and the demolition of labor rights and 
social subsidies (cf. Chang and Graebel 2003). In crafting policy, international development 
agencies increasingly bypassed developing country governments, choosing instead to rely 
instead on the mediation of international and local nongovernmental agencies. 
The trend toward marketization coincided, perhaps awkwardly but certainly not 
incidentally, with an anti-étatist notion that development entailed the empowerment of 
communities and individuals themselves to undertake the “development project.” Obviously, the 
emphasis on local autonomy and grassroots participation was meant to provide a useful 
corrective to top-down development strategies of the past. In policy thinking, in short, the state 
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was retreating as a mechanism for creating social order and the community emerged as a 
compensating mechanism. In a paradigmatic conceptual innovation, the international 
development policy agencies began to use new concepts presumed to drive development – the 
concept of “social capital”5 being one of the most important (cf. Evans 1996). Conceptually, the 
notion of social capital hints at the marriage of the market and community principles. Resources 
inherent in social ties – such as reciprocity, trust, and solidarity – are thought to constitute capital 
which yields interest; for example, access to financial and other social resources. Major actors in 
development policy such as the World Bank and a myriad of NGOs propagated more 
participatory forms of development on the local level. Ideas of globalization “from below” have 
logically focused on diasporas and transstate communities. In this process, the role of the state as 
a principle of social order in development has changed as well. It is now a service provider for 
markets and partly communities, creating the very conditions for market exchange through non-
corrupt rule-making, a stable bureaucracy, and the guarantee of minimum human, civil, and 
political rights (cf. Nuscheler 2004: 405-430). In a nutshell, political and legal structures provide 
the necessary infrastructure for economic growth (North 1990). Notions such as “good 
governance” and establishing the “rule of law” in the aftermath of the “third wave of 
democratization” (Diamond 1996) rule supreme in the universe of developmental concepts.  
In sum, there has been indeed an ideational change in bringing community back in the 
development discourse and, most recently, transstate groups and organizations. While there is 
certainly a strong link between changing concepts and actual public policies, it is necessary to go 
far beyond the supposed role of community, state, and market to unearth the distinct roles of 
each set of principles of social order.  
Community vis-à-vis market and state: complementarities and 
incompatibilities 
While states authoritatively enforce borders and boundaries, and markets verge on a 
borderless world, communities as boundary markers occupy a distinct niche in creating social 
order across borders. The focus here is on how small kinship groups, village communities, 
networks of businesspersons, epistemic cliques, and diasporas interact with actors in states and 
markets.  
Financial capital as remittances: small kinship groups 
For many of the persons belonging to the smallest type of transstate group, namely families 
or kinship groups, border-crossing ties and living modes emerging out of migration may serve as 
a livelihood strategy, quite akin to income out of migration as an insurance mechanism (Nyberg 
Sørensen and Olwig 2002: 2). This involves split households in various states and shadow 
households. Monetary remittances frequently bind immigrants to their kin over long distances 
through ties of reciprocity and solidarity; for example, exchange between generations when 
children work abroad and support their elderly parents and other family members in the country 
of origin.  
Instances of complementarity of community transactions with state and market principles 
are obvious. Transfers of family members signal the dual role of some immigrants as providers 
both for families abroad and for the coffers of the welfare state in the country of employment. In 
social insurance systems for old age pensions, for example, the younger average age of 
immigrants compared to the rest of the population leads to substantial transfers. A study on 
Germany in the late 1980s found that immigration generated positive short-run benefits in 
                                                                  
5 Social capital can be understood in two ways: (1) social ties as resources available to persons (Bourdieu 1983, Loury 
1985); and (2) resources such as reciprocity and solidarity which are available to groups and thus enable cooperation 
(Putnam 1993).  
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selected sectors of the welfare state. The 3.6 million people who immigrated between 1988 and 
1991 made significant contributions: according to this study, 100.000 immigrant employees 
generated 30 billion DM for social insurance against costs of only 14 billion DM – thus a huge 
surplus of 16 billion DM remained (Barabas et al. 1992). On the other side, transstate migrants 
may support kin in the country of origin. Such communities and states often lack state-organized 
social security systems; and if they exist, are inadequate to ensure a minimum standard of living. 
The limits to this dual role lie in the flow of remittances across the life-cycle of migrants. 
These are not necessarily steady flows. There is a general understanding in the literature that 
remittances are likely to decline over time as migrants may become more committed to the 
country or region of settlement (declining in the case of settlement in the immigration country; 
absence upon return). On average, there is a peak period of three to five years in which 
remittances are sent, often followed by a decline at the point at which a migrant achieves 
permanent resident status abroad. Needless to say, such a pattern is not inevitable and may be 
affected by the macro-economic and macro-political context and life events among migrants and 
their families. 
A further element of complementarity is macro-economic. Some emigration states, 
especially those with large amounts of remittances and those in which such transfers reach high 
proportions as a percentage of GDP, have come to use the amount of current and future 
remittances to upgrade their creditworthiness in the financial sector. In this way, migrants’ 
solidarity and reciprocity with their shadow households residing in the country of origin have 
become a “hard-currency receivable” used as a “tradable security” to secure foreign loans for 
economies whose creditworthiness has been downgraded in the international market (Guarnizo 
2003). 
The apparent incompatibility in the case of these transactions do not directly concern the 
activities of families themselves but the ways in which small kinship groups compete with banks 
and other market institutions that constitute formal remittance channels. Briefly put, market 
giants may, in some instances, compete with solidarity systems, such as the unofficial and 
sometimes illegal hawalla and hundi transaction systems. The latter are organized on trust 
among, for example, members of religious communities, and are used in manifold situations. 
These systems allow migrants who wish to transfer remittances to do so without incurring high 
fees. The sending end transmits information to the receiving end, and the remittances are issued 
immediately – based on reciprocal trust. These forms of transactions clash with the more recent 
involvement of large financial corporations in the control of the transfer of remittances 
worldwide. For example, Western Union and MoneyGram controlled as of 1996 as much as 97 
percent of the remittance market and 81 percent of the estimated 43,000 outlets in the US 
(Guarnizo 2003: 686). While the US-Mexican market is dominated by larger corporations, 
remittances to South Asia seem to take place through unofficial channels. A study in Bangladesh, 
for example, showed that 40 percent of remittances are sent through informal hundi sources, 4.6 
percent through friends and relatives, 8 percent are carried by hand by migrants when they 
return, and only 46 percent go through official sources. For Pakistan, senior bankers estimate the 
real flow at between US$ 8-10 billion of which only US $1 billion is actually sent through 
official channels (Hugo 2003: 9). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, various Western 
governments have closed down unofficial channels, arguing that they were used for illicit money 
laundering and explicit terrorist purposes (cf. Mellyn 2003). 
The compatibility between community transactions and state efforts to tap these 
transactions is also questionable. It is often assumed in studies on remittances that the migrants 
concerned emigrated more or less voluntarily. Little attention is paid to refugees, or more 
precisely, those who had few degrees of freedom in exiting. Contentious state-citizen relations in 
the original emigration countries may go a long way in shedding light on the resistance to 
emigration states’ efforts to tap remittances, especially where one of the motivations to emigrate 
was to flee the influence of authoritarian governments. Moreover, if migrants feel that 
governments are simply seeking to tax their diaspora, the compliance to indirect taxation is 
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called into question. In the case of Eritrea, the young state tried to tax expatriates at two percent, 
the so-called “healing tax,” in the late 1980s. Later, the state used the funds remitted to finance 
the war with Ethiopia. 
The protection of rights in immigration countries may not be an incompatibility problem 
since in most of them basic human rights and labor rights standards apply – yet with significant 
differences when comparing EU countries with the Middle East (Gulf) and high-growth Asian 
economies. In the latter, the rights of migrant labor seem to be much less protected, at least at 
least in so far as formal protections are concerned (Weiner 1986). The situation in emigration 
countries involves more than just problems of implementation. Clearly, there is a direct interest 
in remittances. And countries such as the Philippines have gone so far as adjusting their 
educational and health care systems to export workers and services (Martin 2004), a strategy that 
implies a maximization of emigration. At the same time the legitimation of political rule requires 
emigration countries to attend to the human, civil, and social rights of migrant labor abroad. The 
tension between “numbers” versus “rights” clearly has a bearing for the conditions under which 
members of kinship groups, especially those employed in critical sectors such as domestic 
services and construction, are able to negotiate the terms of their employment (cf. Rodriguez 
2002).6  
In important ways incompatibilities affect small groups, which are changing as a result of 
learning during the migration process itself. In some cases, the “feminization of migration” 
resulted in the very transformation of gender relations which constituted the backbone of the 
migratory arrangements in small and large kinship groups. In Bangladesh, the migration of 
women to Malaysia led to changes in social practices. Malaysia is considered a role model for 
Bangladesh, and is also a Muslim country. Once the flow of women from Bangladesh to 
Malaysia had started, young women sought to emigrate, resulting in increased economic 
independence. Those engaging in migration gave loans to other women and also participated in 
the labor force in Bangladesh. Since female labor force participation in Malaysia is relatively 
high, migrant and even non-migrant women adopted some of the same practices in Bangladesh 
(Dannecker 2005). Yet we also know of other cases in which transstate practices exacerbated 
gendered power structures, especially when control over financial remittances rested with men 
(cf. Mahler and Pessar 2001 on El Salvador). These examples suggest that transstate groups 
should not be regarded simply as unitary actors in all respects but rather as social collectives 
connected by sometimes conflicting social and symbolic ties. 
Financial capital as investments: village associations 
A perspective on village communities makes transstate transactions for the most part trans-
local, that is, local-to-local relations across state borders. Examples are numerous, and village 
communities come in diverse shapes, such as home-town associations in the case of Mexico, 
returnee associations in Jamaica, or charitable foundations in Egypt. Such communities provide 
significant resources for community development at the local level by, for example, involving 
themselves in providing construction materials for their home town church, raising money to 
improve water and sewage systems or health and education services, helping to organize relief 
efforts following natural disasters, or channeling remittances, especially in the Americas. 
While traditional emigration countries, such as Italy, have long had policies and programs 
for (former) citizens living overseas, it is only relatively recently that emigration states have 
reshaped their relationship to hometown associations, often in a reactive way (cf. Goldring 2002 
on Mexico). An even newer phenomenon is the interest shown by international organizations in 
                                                                  
6 There is a clear distinction between legal employment under which workers have recourse to legal protection, and 
illegal employment, which does not include social rights. While this is an important divide, employment relationships 
offer different opportunities for various categories of migrants. For example, for workers sent abroad as contract labor 
still employed by companies in the countries of origin, social rights in the country of temporary employment may not 
be of utmost importance. Also, seasonal workers may not have the flexibility they wish if employed under worker 
programs since employers usually hire those they consider most docile (cf. Faist 2003). 
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the possibility that transplanted village communities could be useful in more than the 
maintenance of culture but might also play a significant role in the economic development 
strategy of the emigration country (Lucas 2001). The complementarity of activities of hometown 
associations and state efforts can easily be seen in the ways that communities and states 
cooperate in improving the infrastructure in hometown regions. A well-known example is 
Mexico’s “3-for-1 program,” a model for the much-touted public-private partnership initiatives 
in development policy (PPP). Each $1 of remittances from hometown associations in 
government approved development projects receives an additional $1 in matching funds each 
from federal, state, and local governments. Other examples relate to tourism from immigrant 
communities to the “old country,” constituting a major earner for countries from Ireland to 
Vietnam. Clearly, as with family remittances, hometown associations privilege certain places. 
Frictions between communities and states emerge when home town associations have pursued 
political goals at variance with those of local, regional, or national governments. The response of 
states has been repression and surveillance of emigrants abroad on the one hand but on the other 
hand, stronger efforts, at times, to cater to the interests of the diaspora, for example, by 
delivering services through consular institutions or campaigning abroad, as in the case of 
Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the USA. 
Yet there are incompatibilities which clearly go beyond mere divergence of interests and 
pose more fundamental dilemmas. Transstate organizations and groups are able to join exit and 
voice, and do so through geographic mobility and strengthening transstate ties. While the 
complementarity of exit and voice may be applauded from a normative point of view, such as the 
increased empowerment it thus provides for those who are mobile, the transnationalization of 
political participation creates tensions between mobile and relatively immobile people and 
associations. There is a basic dilemma arising out of the democratic principle that those who take 
decisions should also be part of those affected by them – yet although transnationals are 
participating in decision-making, when it comes to the consequences of decisions they act as 
third parties. This fundamental dilemma is particularly striking in transformation countries, such 
as Mexico, which have built up an infrastructure reaching out to emigrants abroad. There is a 
wide array of instruments. These range from the Paisano Program, consular registrations 
(matricula), and the Institute of Mexicans Abroad to efforts to institutionalize dual citizenship 
and political rights, such as dual nationality (1996) and the possibility of extraterritorial voting in 
national elections (2005). Such programs are actually likely to stimulate and promote transstate 
associations. And they thus advance transstate forms of citizenship. On the local level in 
particular, however, such transstate forms are not insignificant because, quite often, substantial 
parts of the so-called community of origin are residing (temporarily) abroad. The latter is an 
effect of chain migration. The problem is not quite as pernicious on the national level because 
usually a much lower percentage of the overall population is engaged in transstate migration. 
The dominant pattern of transstate migration is that there are few migrants from most places and 
many from a few places (locales) – taking states as the broader unit of analysis. In essence, 
transnationalization enhances the combination of exit and voice on a sustained basis and 
therefore contributes to the unequal chances for exercising political rights. 
Financial capital as investments: networks of businesspersons 
Emigrants and the children of emigrants living abroad are sometimes seen by the 
governments in the country of origin as “effective middlemen” (China) who play a crucial role in 
brokering foreign investments or investing themselves. Yet it is also a common assumption that 
development defined as economic growth does not depend primarily on the inflow of financial 
capital but on entrepreneurial spirit (Hirschmann 1947). Businesspersons as communities of 
practice may foster an atmosphere in which an entrepreneurial spirit of the “Protestant” and 
other kinds conducive to economic success might grow (Weber 1958). Cases at hand are 
emigrants from mainland China, Taiwan, and India. Overseas Indians who settled in Silicon 
Valley in the USA, for example, contributed to the rise of the region around Bangalore as the hub 
of the Indian industry in information technology. Indian emigrants who worked as highly skilled 
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specialists in Silicon Valley invested in the burgeoning Indian IT industry. Software specialists in 
India were already employed by overseas companies to process data and develop programs. The 
Indian investors from Silicon Valley added another dimension in setting up companies in India. 
Other multinational companies from the USA and Europe followed suit (cf. Cornelius, 
Espenshade, and Salehyan 2001). The Taiwanese experience parallels this case (Tseng 2000).  
In these cases of a large and well-educated tertiary sector of citizens living abroad, the 
potential for foreign investment is high. Again, about 20 million citizens from India live abroad, 
a diaspora second in size only to that of China. It is estimated that the income of this category 
amounts to more than a third of India’s GDP. It is therefore no surprise that this category, called 
“non-resident Indians” (NRI), as a community provided about 10 per cent of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in India and a sizable part of venture capital. The People’s Republic of China 
may serve as a case par excellence: about 50 per cent of FDI comes from some 30 million 
overseas Chinese. Successive Chinese governments have created incentives for capital 
investment by overseas Chinese in selected enterprise areas (e.g., Saxenian 2002). Undoubtedly, 
global production chains, in this case software development and processing, have made 
investments like these more feasible and more profitable. Yet we know very little about the 
networks and cliques businesspersons entertain among each other and with bridging brokers in 
the emigration country. We need to know more about how businesspersons act  as brokers, as 
communities in between -- sometimes called “transstate workers” or “temporary returnees” who 
work in emigration and immigration regions and play a role as middlemen linking businesses in 
the two regions with their personal networks and technological and market know-how. It seems 
plausible to assume that quite a few expatriates investing in their countries of origin have insider 
advantages, such as knowledge of the language and local customs, and are likely to enjoy the 
trust of bureaucrats who administer economic planning (cf. Rauch 2001). 
Governments have implemented a host of policies to attract both highly skilled emigrants 
from abroad as returnees and entice those who stay overseas to maintain productive links. For 
example, the Indian government offers tax incentives for expatriates, and tries to use their 
expertise, advice, and ideas to equip Indian companies, and to create opportunities for overseas 
Indian companies. One symbolic but highly visible instrument has been a special resident status 
for expatriate businesspersons, akin to dual citizenship. This status has created added entry 
options for privileged groups.  
This example already hints at potential incompatibilities between communities of practice 
and states. The Chinese state, for instance, encourages cross-border flows of financial capital but 
certainly objects to the import of political ideas via expatriates. Expatriates’ ideas concerning 
liberalization of the political regime and a greater recognition of human rights and democratic 
ideals have certainly not been welcome, albeit the groups involved in the transfer of economic 
versus political capital are not one and the same, students vs. businesspersons. 
The thorny issue of the selectivity effects of development via transnationalization is here 
even more obvious than in cases of remittances. States and economic elites join to sponsor 
investments, perhaps to the detriment of certain sectors of education and the economy. The 
Indian government, for example, has heavily sponsored advanced institutes of learning, the 
Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT). No such concerted effort can be discerned when it comes 
to basic education. Certainly, in this case the federal and provincial states have created the 
preconditions necessary for the communities of businesspersons to offer services and investment. 
Such a coalition of states and communities of businesspersons in planning and implementing 
foreign direct investments makes it farfetched to consider such processes “bottom up” 
development (cf. Bhagwati 2003). 
For immigration countries, immigrant or ethnic entrepreneurship may be part of beneficial 
transstate business ties. Canadian based studies have shown that a doubling of skilled migration 
from Asia saw a 74 percent increase in Asian imports in Canada (Page and Adams 2004). Ethnic 
entrepreneurship may also be instrumental in creating jobs for immigrants and natives. Markets 
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may expand in two directions. First, nostalgia among immigrants for the foods and products of 
the country of origin creates markets for those products in the immigration country, fostering 
local production and international trade (e.g., Turkish immigrants in Germany). Second, migrant 
entrepreneurs may invest in the countries of origin and thus contribute directly to economic 
development abroad. Although there is heated debate over the exact benefits provided by so-
called ethnic niches, enclaves, and ethnic markets and for which category (e.g. ethnic 
entrepreneurs vs. co-ethnic workers; cf. Sanders 2002), migrant entrepreneurship is a prime 
example of financial capital following persons, or more precisely, capital accumulated by those 
persons first attracted abroad by capital. In all these processes, social capital is a crucial bridging 
mechanism. 
Knowledge: epistemic communities 
Epistemic communities of scholars and experts are exemplary communities of practice 
without propinquity. Scientists and professional experts share common models, theories, and 
sometimes even life styles characterized by high geographical mobility. Recently, major political 
actors such as international organizations and governments have started to focus on not only the 
emigration or re-migration or return of highly skilled professionals but also on the formation of 
transstate networks. This shift of perspective is partly a result of the fact that while many of the 
highly skilled do not return to the regions of origin, they nonetheless form border-crossing 
epistemic networks in which the countries of origin are sometimes involved. For example, half 
of all foreign students who earn PhDs in the USA are still in that country five years later. The 
OECD (1998) estimates the total brain drain from developing countries to OECD countries to be 
about 12.9 million persons, with 7 million in the USA alone. The flip side is a massive outflow 
from emigration regions: according to the World Bank Africa, for example, lost one third of its 
executives between 1960 and 1987 (Stalker 1994). In short, the role of knowledge exchange for 
economic growth and development has regained importance over recent years; indeed, resource 
transfers across countries are nowadays discussed within the framework of the knowledge 
society (Stehr 1992). There are numerous claims about the importance of knowledge transfer and 
scientific cooperation for development (World Bank 1999). In connection with public policies, 
there have been increased efforts to connect migration policies to research policies in the 
developing states, transformation states, and industrial countries (e.g. BMZ 2001:12). 
It is noteworthy that academic analysis of the developmental consequences of the mobility 
of highly skilled persons has paralleled political expectations: in the 1960s, a majority of 
analyses entertained the idea of a “brain gain” for developing countries, and mobility was seen 
as a resource for modernizing developing countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, the reverse was 
true, that is, the more critical view of the “brain drain” carried the day, with the underlying 
assumption that emigration was harmful to developing countries. This is not surprising because 
such studies situated the phenomenon within the dependency literature paradigm. In the course 
of the 1990s, the dominant academic and political mood shifted again. Experts and politicians 
from industrial countries in need of highly-skilled technological specialists now assert that there 
is a “brain circulation,” an apparently neutral term (cf. Appleyard 1999). There are claims about 
mutual benefits for all actors involved, for the highly skilled as well as for the emigration and 
immigration countries themselves, such as the creation of jobs in the software industry and 
increasing capital investment from abroad. In highly industrialized countries public policies 
directed toward recruiting highly skilled migrants now routinely also include efforts to attract 
international students. Subsequently, some OECD countries such as Germany have recently 
changed their legislation to allow international students to remain or to re-enter, once they have 
completed their studies. At the same time, countries of emigration have begun to take initiatives 
to reverse the “brain drain.” Examples include the Indian government’s efforts to sponsor 
investments by expatriates in the Information Technology (IT) sector. 
There are various possible outcomes of brain transfer – (1) brain drain followed by brain 
gain, (2) brain drain, and (3) a “global brain chain.” In the first case, brain drain followed by 
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brain gain, there is usually deficit at exit, followed by possible gains not only for migrants and 
immigration countries but also for emigration countries. The emigration of the highly skilled 
may be advantageous for those remaining in the country of origin, when educated people leave 
and report back that they have been economically successful. Such communication creates an 
incentive to those left behind to improve their knowledge and social capital, for example, by 
investing in higher education. Such processes may happen on a large scale, but only a small 
percentage of those whose capital assets have improved will actually leave, while the rest will 
stay in the country of origin and benefit from improved education in the home country (Stark and 
Wang 2001). In the case of brain drain, there is no replacement capability, an outcome that seems 
to affect the poorest countries especially. Prominent empirical examples include the so-called 
(health) “care drain” from Zambia, Liberia, and Zimbabwe. Nurses and medical doctors from 
these and other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa fill the gaps in the health systems of developed 
countries although the deficits in their countries of origin are very large, not least because of the 
AIDS/HIV pandemic in Southern Africa. Meanwhile, health care systems in OECD countries 
reap the benefits. In the UK, for example, 1 out of 10 persons working in health care came from 
developing countries in the early 1990s. By 2002, within a period of ten years, more than 5 out 
of 10 originated in overseas regions outside the UK.7 The third possibility is a global brain chain 
or “staged cascade” which may involve both brain drain and brain gain. A noteworthy example is 
medical doctors who move from Canada to the USA, who are, in turn, replaced by South 
Africans in Canada. At the far end of the chain, Cubans physicians relocate to South Africa.  
In immigration countries notions of economic globalization have led to an increased effort 
by companies and states to attract post-secondary international students and future scientists. 
OECD countries have thus changed their legislation, moving from a red card to a red carpet 
strategy. The hunt for knowledge workers is nonetheless reminiscent of “body shopping” and the 
poaching of workers, a well-known strategy employed by many countries emulating the success 
of economic leaders, e.g. eighteenth-century England attracting workers from the Netherlands 
(cf. Chang 2002). The difference is, however, that nowadays it is not the countries catching up 
that engage in poaching but those who are furthest ahead. The USA is currently the only country 
with a positive balance vis-à-vis all the other countries in the world at the same time. Persons of 
foreign origin make up 12 percent of the entire highly qualified segment of the US labor market. 
Nonetheless, this share is similar in other OECD countries. Thus, while in simple numbers the 
contribution of the developing world to the developed is relatively marginal, it is nevertheless 
strategically important since it eases shortages in the labor market in the target countries.  
For developing and some transformation countries the volume of skills involved is sizeable. 
What constitutes a small proportion of personnel in the North is a large one for the South. For 
instance, about one third of researchers and engineers originating in developing countries works 
in OECD countries. Generally, transformation countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, 
have greater leverage and may succeed in re-attracting their intellectuals. Also, proportionally 
fewer and fewer Chinese students go abroad to study (Meyer 2005). Overall, there is mounting 
evidence that some epistemic communities of scholars and experts also reach back into countries 
of origin (see, e.g., Barré et al. 2003; Meyer and Charum 1995). Obviously, we observe a 
complementarity of community on the one hand and market and state on the other hand in the 
case of brain gain, while an incompatibility exists in case of brain drain, such as the care drain 
out of least-developed countries. 
Interestingly, there are clear limits to state sponsorship and hierarchical control of epistemic 
communities. Currently, roughly forty such networks are documented throughout the world, 
involving about thirty-five developing countries. These networks concern activities such as joint 
                                                                  
7 Another possibility associated with the mobility of the highly skilled is “brain waste,” that is, professionals who are 
employed as domestics in immigration countries (e.g., Filipino nurses in Gulf states in the household sector), or highly 
skilled workers who return to their country of origin but cannot find employment at their skill level, such as natural 
scientists who do not have access to appropriate laboratories. The worst case scenario is called “brain desertification.” 
In this case the highly skilled do not return and do not sustain any ties with those who stayed in the countries of origin. 
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research projects, information exchange, technology transfers, joint ventures, or training 
sessions. Many of these epistemic communities are based on the idea that return is not the only 
alternative to a skills exodus. For them, there is an alternative transstate option. Not only 
national governments but also international organizations are engaged in setting up such 
networks, as reflected in, for example, policy programs like the United Nations Development 
Program’s “Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals.” The policy involves the 
production of databases of skilled nationals overseas who may be willing to engage in particular 
development projects. Another example is the International Organization of Migration’s (IOM) 
“Migration for Development in Africa” (MIDA) program, which seeks to mobilize the skills of 
African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development. Yet emigration of the highly-
skilled can be beneficial only if there is already a minimal stock of highly qualified people. 
Otherwise, there is no replacement capacity. An indication of this is that about 250,000 African-
born professionals work outside Africa, and 100,000 non-African professionals in Africa are 
employed by UN agencies or through NGOs.  
While systems of training and research are predominantly organized along national lines, 
epistemic communities often evade the narrow principles of the “national interest.” An important 
case in point is the network Red Caldas, set up by the Colombian government in the early 1990s 
(Chaparro et al. 2004). This experience suggests the importance of specialized research 
communities, built along decentralized networks, which have a genuinely transstate orientation. 
In the first phase, the government set up centralized radial networks, which developed later into 
epistemic communities with a decentralized character. In this stage the project developed along 
national nodes from the early- to the mid-1990s. The government established national nodes in 
all countries around the globe which had a critical mass of Colombian graduate students and 
researchers -- all in all 27 countries and 874 researchers and graduate students were involved. 
Working groups formed which brought together researchers in Colombia, Colombian researchers 
in the various countries abroad, and researchers from developed countries who were interested in 
these topics. Red Caldas maintained a registry of such projects. In the second half of the 1990s it 
turned out that both researchers based in Colombia and those abroad did not congregate so much 
around the national nodes but congealed in specialized epistemic communities. Also, Red Caldas 
evolved into a “network of networks” when support from the center – the government – 
diminished. The national nodes practically disappeared in the late 1990s. The epistemic 
communities in which researchers associated with Colombia actually participated had a more 
clearly defined membership and defined activities, and were characterized by a more 
participatory rather than hierarchical model. In sum, the state-centric effort to establish transstate 
epistemic communities along national lines failed, while decentralized networks succeeded in 
attracting natural and social scientists. 
Epistemic communities and the associated flows of knowledge are an excellent example of 
the different principles of providing goods in communities, markets, and states. Communities 
provide club goods, as distinct from private goods and public goods. While public goods and 
thus the common good provided by states are in an ideal typical way characterized by the twin 
principles of non-excludability and access for all, that is, non-exclusiveness, private goods are at 
the opposite end. Club goods are in between in that non-members can actually be excluded. 
However, based on membership, the goods provided are indeed collective (cf. Breuer, Faist and 
Jordan 1995). Put briefly, it is the boundaries between members and non-members that matter 
most in the provision of club goods. In the case of epistemic communities knowledge is akin to a 
club good, situated in between knowledge as a public and a private good. On the one hand, the 
increasing knowledge flows across borders, helped by the rapid dissemination and adoption of 
information and communication technologies, suggest that knowledge, an essential value for 
development, can be considered a public good. On the other hand, knowledge is a private good, 
reflected in the importance of industrial property rights (IPRs) and other forms of knowledge 
appropriation. Obviously, the production of and the access to knowledge is selective. Transstate 
epistemic communities provide mechanisms for the translation of science into knowledge as a 
factor of production and decision-making. Certain forms of knowledge are generated through 
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communities of practice of like-minded people or peers who work in a given field or on a given 
topic. Epistemic communities are also connected to extension workers and end-users (so-called 
stakeholders). In short, epistemic communities of practice are organizational forms for producing 
and accessing “protected knowledge” that circulates freely only within these communities, and 
accessible only to members. Members of such communities thus occupy the function of 
“strategic groups” (Evers and Schiel 1988), connecting knowledge as a private and a public 
good. 
Political ideas and interests: ethno-national communities 
The third form of capital transfer constitutes the most visible threat to the compatibility of 
transstate communities and states, namely politico-cultural capital exchanged in ethno-national 
communities. Three categories of transstate communities in particular pose three degrees of 
potential challenge to the so-called homeland or country of origin or country of emigration: 
refugees/exiles, stateless diasporas, and state-based diasporas. The role of all three categories 
clearly goes far beyond the flow of financial capital (e.g., financing rebel armies, cf. Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000) and goes to the heart of the definition of interests and identities of political 
communities. States are not only based upon organizational infrastructure and various 
mechanisms of legitimate rule-making and rule implementation but also on common elements of 
identity which underpin political communities such as nations. Refugees, émigrés, and members 
of stateless diasporas at first sight seem to be challengers or even competitors of existing 
(emigration) states. The transfer of politico-cultural capital takes various forms, ranging from the 
activities of émigrés aimed at the improvement of human rights in their countries of origin to 
long-distance nationalism, which strives to form a new nation state. Long distance nationalism, 
in particular, can be traced back to the early days of the nation-state. One of its critics, Lord 
Acton, called diasporas “the nursery of nationality.” 
Refugees and exiles have often  had significant impact on political development, by 
mediating between competing groups or providing resources for reconciliation and 
reconstruction. Prominent examples include the South African diaspora’s role in the anti-
apartheid movement and the more recent engagement of the Ugandan and Nigerian diasporas. In 
these cases the rhetoric mobilizing such efforts has been good governance and rule of law, the 
implementation of human rights and democratization. No less important is the role played by 
refugee and exile communities that have fuelled conflicts in the countries of origin from abroad, 
such as Kosovo Albanians (cf. Hockenos 2003), the Mujahedin in the case of Iran, or Chechen 
freedom fighters. A higher degree of politico-cultural coherence can be found among “stateless” 
diasporas whose declared intention is the founding of a new nation-state or at least achieving a 
high degree of autonomy in the declared homeland. Such communities are represented by 
organizations or liberation movements which are in clear conflict with the former homeland, as 
the cases of some Kurdish and Tamil communities attest (cf. Van Hear 2003). 
At first sight a higher degree of complementarity is apparent in the case of “state-based” 
and established diasporas, such as the Armenian, Chinese, and Palestianian diasporas in the USA 
and Europe. Sometimes such established diasporas are considered by the homeland as strategic 
assets, as in the Chinese government’s view of highly skilled “overseas Chinese.” The notion 
that homeland and diaspora constitute one people is especially strong for relatively weak, new, or 
reconstituted states, in conflicts with other states or groups, e.g., Armenian-Azeri (cf. Shain 
2002). One may argue that national diasporas who participate in the foreign affairs of a country 
of settlement move from being disenfranchised groups to one with an entry ticket into 
mainstream society and politics (e.g., Shain 1999 on US-American foreign policy). Yet strong 
diasporas and fledgling home states produce a complex setup of international and transstate 
politics, which goes beyond the notion of “two level games” (Putnam 1988). The concept of 
two-level games considers both domestic political constituencies and the counterpart’s minimum 
demands. Intervention by strong diasporas implies an extension into a three level game, 
especially in conflict perpetuation and resolution. Moreover, established diasporas may play a 
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crucial role in the definition of “national interest” and “national identity,” both of which are 
flexible, rather than static, constructs. Interests of the diaspora and the home state may 
significantly diverge, and are not a unified whole. Forms of transstate identity may connect both 
homeland and host country. There are instances of transstate identities of a nationalist kind, as in 
the case of Poland and Ireland and their diasporas in the United States which formed in the 
nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries. In exceptional cases, some interpretations 
of the transstate identity may be detached from a national identity and thus compete with statist 
transnationalism, as in the idea of a Jewish diaspora not centered on the state of Israel but in a 
transstate or even global diaspora (Boyarin 1994).  
All of this suggests that a transstate perspective on national interests and national identities 
can support, compete, or even challenge the congruence of a people, territory, and authority in a 
state. One of the challenges goes beyond this trinity. If transstate communities conceive of 
themselves as diasporas connected to a nation-building project, such as Kosovar Albanians in the 
late 1990s, they usually portray themselves as ethnically homogenous entities; in short, a Volk 
based more on common cultural heritage than subjective predispositions of citizens toward a 
state and a constitution. There is an inherent tension between the concept of state usually 
advocated by nationalist diasporas according to which the members constitute a Volk, on the one 
hand, and a democratic concept which sees the political community made up of all its varied 
citizens, on the other hand. 
Outlook: transstate social spaces and states 
This analysis has suggested some of the ways in which communities play a role in 
transnationalization and development in pointing out interaction with other principles of social 
order, especially market and state. The units covered by the term “community” and transstate 
social spaces themselves are under constant reconstruction. Moreover, the changing relationship 
and demarcation line between market, state, and community is itself a product of contentious 
politics and public policies (Stratton and Orchard 1994). Two issues need to be considered in 
further research: first, the reconstruction of transstate groups, associations, networks, and 
organizations; second, the changing role of how states open and restrict transstate social spaces. 
The former helps to avoid the essentialization of transstate subjects and to counter the tendency 
of both academic research and policy-making to reconstruct transstate collective subjects as 
unitary actors. The latter focus is necessary to clarify the changing role of states. More attention 
needs to be paid to how states structure transstate social spaces, for example, through the 
regulation of transstate migration.8  
The empirical examples discussed here suggest that transstate collectives, such as groups, 
associations, organizations, and diasporas, cannot be treated as unitary actors if one wants to 
understand the tensions inherent in transstate spaces and the implications for the 
conceptualization of transnationalization. Certainly, the opportunities for transstate actors have 
changed in the process of globalization, not only for migrant-based collectives (cf. Evans 2000). 
Because of the apparent increase in interconnectedness through long-distance communication, 
facilitated face-to-face communication and interaction through travel and interaction, and the 
diffusion of ideas and knowledge, social life across the borders of states has become more dense 
and extensive. The spaces “in between” states have multiplied. Some of the cherished concepts 
of migration research need to be questioned because they may not be adequate to capture more 
fluid life-styles, modes of action, and collective behavior. The lives of migrants are not 
necessarily characterized by one-time settlement and commitment to one society or associations 
and groups in one society. Therefore, dichotomous distinctions such as “origin” vs. “destination” 
and “emigration” vs. “immigration” no longer hold, if only because many traditional emigration 
                                                                  
8 For an analysis of how market processes interact with migration in the case of two tightly intermeshed economies, 
see Wise and Covarrubias (2005). 
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countries have become both transit and immigration countries, Turkey being a typical example. 
Less obviously, other dichotomies such as “temporary vs. permanent” or “labor migrant vs. 
refugee” also no longer hold if the goal is to map trajectories of mobile populations. One first 
step has been a renewed interest in the notion of social space. This has implied, among other 
things, the need to conceptualize migration beyond its demographic construction as “flows” and 
“stocks” of people and to look at the “in between places.” This train of rethinking should not 
stop at other important notions such as citizenship. Clearly, transstate social spaces do not 
necessarily imply that communities of origin and communities of destination are congruent in 
terms of interests and ideas. As mentioned above, transnationals who do not permanently reside 
in the community of origin may hold very different notions of development from those “at 
home.” This problem of incongruence has not been paid sufficient attention in terms of its 
conceptual implications. For example, notions such as transstate citizenship are used to describe 
political participation, rights, duties, and belonging of transstate migrants through mechanisms 
such as hometown associations. But an important element of citizenship is equal political 
freedom, the principle of democracy -- a principle that holds that those taking decisions (voice) 
should not be able to exit at will. While we may still want to use the term citizenship in a 
transstate context, we would want to avoid the ecological fallacy of simply transposing concepts 
from the nation-state level to transstate social spaces. 
Nonetheless, the concept of the nation-state is critical to defining the opportunity structures 
in transstate social spaces and transactions connected to development. Contrary to assumptions 
about the declining role of the state principle vis-à-vis market and community, states do play an 
active role in shaping the very conditions for transstate subjects engaged in development issues. 
The relationship of community to what is called globalization has been even more obvious in the 
efforts of national governments to reshape immigration policy. In a departure from the 1960s, 
public policies now focus not only on return migration as a way to development but on the 
sponsorship of transstate networks. Policymakers in advanced welfare states in OECD countries 
have connected immigration with the future of social provisions. Facing a demographic 
transition of considerable magnitude, one line of argument sees immigration as a contribution to 
rejuvenate labor markets, maintain population size to ensure future economic growth, and soften 
the transition to other forms of old-age pension schemes and rejuvenating labor markets. In 
short, the issue of replacement migration (UN Population Division 2000) has climbed up the 
ladder of policy instruments in the contemporary restructuring of welfare states. One of the 
justifications for using immigration for economic purposes and thus clearly defining the 
“national interest” in European countries is the effort to recast the effects of transstate migration 
for developing countries. This trend is nowhere as visible as in the issue of migrants with a 
tertiary education.  
Contemporary immigration policy in the OECD world, as we have seen, is partly concerned 
with competition for the best brains in the world, in efforts to attract not only highly skilled 
workers as permanent or temporary settlers for sectors such as information technology, but also 
international students. This investment in knowledge will help, it is believed, to weather the 
storms of global economic competition and the increasing competition among institutions of 
higher education and research (see, for example, Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission 
Zuwanderung 2001 in Germany). Increasingly, the obvious criticism of the brain drain effect of 
such policies is countered by references to the actual evidence and potential rewards of brain 
gain. The French and the British governments, for example, have rationalized the selective 
recruitment of highly skilled experts by introducing cooperative development schemes 
(cf. House of Commons 2004).  
Such trends lie not only in the economic dimension of social order but also in the political 
realm. New international political constellations after the breakdown of the Communist world, 
the long-term spread of human rights and democracy as normative meta-discourses, and the 
rampant implosion of political order in some parts of the developing world have led to an ever 
increasing number of armed interventions, such as those that are often justified on humanitarian 
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grounds or to counter terrorism. Western powers have intervened to end conflicts in the non-
OECD world, and have engaged in post-war reconstruction efforts on a large and still expanding 
scale. These efforts require an army of experts to build the rudiments of rule of law, sometimes 
from scratch, as in Afghanistan, for example. One of the crucial management questions has been 
the selection of personnel for such ventures. There is an ongoing debate on whether to look for 
refugees and exiles of the “first generation” who are likely to be intimately familiar with the 
situation based on their own experience, or to seek out younger persons, such as the children of 
migrants “with a migration background,” who may not be personally involved (see, for example, 
von Carlowitz 2004). 
These considerations on the role of states already suggest that the changing role of the state 
in development policy thinking and actual policies should go beyond its function in maintaining 
boundaries, that is, infrastructural tasks for markets. Indeed, states play a much more activist role 
in development policy in addition to and beyond providing macro-economic conditions. To take 
but one example, the border control policies of immigration countries are intimately connected 
to enabling and restricting transstate mobility of persons and the potential of transstate groups 
and associations. The European Union (EU) moved its policies from fighting “root causes” to the 
conditionality of development aid (cf. European Commission 2002). At the 2002 European 
summit in Seville the leaders of the member states agreed that each future association or 
cooperation agreement which the EU/EC concludes with any country should include a clause on 
joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal 
immigration. Yet the EU’s effort to link migration control to external aid is somewhat lopsided in 
favour of the control side. The largest share of the budget was allocated to “management of 
migration flows,” that is, strengthening border control and mitigating illegal or irregular 
migration. Even more explicit are contracts between immigration and emigration countries on a 
bilateral level, which rest on emigration countries being willing to take back rejected asylum 
seekers and to control undocumented migration. The lead was taken by Italy when it offered 
temporary work permits and official development aid to willing countries such as Albania and 
Tunisia. It is noteworthy that the EU and its Mediterranean rim may be a special case not 
comparable to other forms of supranational organization because the EU has engaged in a logic 
of expansion creating the need for increased border control functions for the set of countries 
adjoining the current EU borders – so far linked to the prospect of joining the EU in the long run. 
It is of utmost importance to consider not only direct development policies but also indirect and 
powerful mechanisms like border controls and thus internal boundaries of states. It is within such 
opportunity spaces that transstate social spaces emerge and are populated by transstate groups 
and associations. 
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